As regards the execution of the plan, questions might well
be raised as to the conduct of the ground phases of the campaign. The ground
assault started auspiciously on 10 July with the greatest amphibious attack
ever undertaken by any armed force. Within seventy-two hours after the initial
seaborne landings, the two Allied armies advancing abreast had practically
secured their designated objectives. On the east coast, the Eighth Army entered
Augusta on the morning of 12 July. Thus far, its advance had not been seriously
contested. The bulk of the defending forces, particularly the German
contingent, was off to the west, one portion counterattacking the Seventh Army
near Gela and Biscari, the other part hurriedly moving eastward to block any
further American advances inland from Licata. Catania was almost in sight. The
only force of any consequence opposing Eighth Army's two assault corps was the
German Group Schmalz, and this force was almost certainly not strong enough to
stop an aggressive thrust north from Augusta. The Seventh Army, for its part
and after the initial Axis counterattacks at Gela, had pushed on strongly, so
strongly that its left task force-the reinforced 3d Division-had run out of
objectives and was poised to strike inland at the key communications center of
Enna. Highway 124, the important east-west highway, was almost in Seventh
Army's grasp. Several huge gaps had been created in the Axis line, gaps that
were being held halfheartedly by remnants of the Livorno and Napoli Divisions.
It was at this very point on the evening of 12 July, when
the Allied armies were in the best position of the entire campaign for
finishing off the Axis defenders quickly and pushing on through to Messina,
that General Alexander, for some unknown reason, permitted General Montgomery
to change the Eighth Army's plans. Instead of moving along a single major axis
of advance, throwing his army's entire weight against the German defenders at
Catania, Montgomery split his assault corps into a two-pronged effort, one
prong continuing along the east coast highway, the other prong swinging to the
west across Seventh Army's front around Mount Etna. At the same time, Alexander
changed the Seventh Army axis of advance from the north to the west and again
relegated Patton's force to the passive role of guarding Montgomery's flank and
rear. For all practical purposes, Seventh Army could have stayed on the
beaches; its brilliant assault achievements were completely nullified by the
new British plan.
Why Alexander permitted this to happen has never been
satisfactorily explained. Seventh Army was moving ahead nicely; it almost had
Highway 124; the German and Italian forces in front of it had been practically
dissolved or withdrawn. The German forces from the west, not really strong
enough to contest an advance all along the line, were still scrambling to the
east in a desperate effort to close the tremendous gap in the center of the
Axis line. No enemy force of any size opposed either the 1st or 45th Divisions.
General Bradley, the II Corps commander, was ready and willing to take Highway
124 and Enna, thus encircling the German defenders facing Eighth Army. In North
Africa, the remainder of the 82d Airborne and 2d Armored Divisions lay ready to
sail for Sicily to reinforce the American effort. But apparently it was
Alexander's distrust of the American fighting man that permitted him to accept
Montgomery's plan of a two-pronged British advance, of dividing Eighth Army in
the face of the enemy. Or it may be that General Eisenhower's opinion of
Alexander-"At times it seems that he alters his own plans and ideas merely
to meet an objection or a suggestion of a subordinate, so as to avoid direct command
methods" -was correct.
Alexander's permission given to Montgomery to launch Eighth
Army on its ill-fated two-pronged offensive constituted the turning point in
the Sicilian Campaign. From this date on the course of the campaign could not
have proceeded much differently. The Axis forces, suddenly relieved of the
tremendous American pressure along most of their front, were now given enough
time to prepare strong defensive positions in the mountainous interior, and the
rest of the campaign turned into little more-except for Patton's spectacular
dash into Palermo, almost a publicity agent's stunt-than digging the enemy out
of strongpoints and knocking him off mountain tops. It was not until 23 July,
when General Alexander finally turned Seventh Army toward Messina, that even
these tactics paid off.
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