His stated purpose was “to end
useless human and material destruction.” On the Allied side, however, the
Soviet Union objected vehemently, fearing betrayal by the Americans and the
British through the conclusion of a separate peace, while Wolff encountered
strong opposition from his SS superiors, Ernst Kaltenbrunner and Heinrich
Himmler, who were engineering their own exit strategy. Meeting with Adolf
Hitler in Berlin, he successfully pretended his aim was to persuade the
Americans to join with the Germans against the Soviets.
Although Dulles had initially been instructed to terminate
discussions with Wolff, the order was reversed on 26 April; three days later,
surrender documents were signed at Allied headquarters in Caserta. The SS
general also received special protection from Dulles’s aide, Gero von
Schulze-Gaevernitz, in face of the threat posed by Italian partisans. This bold
operation had particular significance, for not only was a costly last-ditch
stand by German forces averted, but these troops were prevented from finding
sanctuary in a rumored Alpine fortress and waging a guerrilla campaign.
MAX WAIBEL, (1901–1971).
A key liaison in Operation sunrise, Max Waibel was the head
of Swiss army intelligence during World War II and a confidant of Allen Dulles,
the Bern station chief for the U.S. Office of Strategic Services. It was Waibel
who, in February 1945, alerted Dulles to the possibility of achieving a
negotiated cease-fire with German forces in northern Italy under the command of
Karl Wolff. Waibel initially came under sharp criticism for his unauthorized
role in helping to bring about this capitulation but was posthumously honored
by the Swiss government for obeying his conscience and thereby preventing
further wartime destruction. After the war, Waibel was instrumental in
establishing a working relationship between Swiss authorities and the
Organisation Gehlen, particularly regarding communist subversion. His account
of sunrise—1945: Kapitulation in Norditalien (Capitulation in Northern Italy)—
appeared in 1981.
Gero von
Schulze-Gaevernitz and Allan Welsh Dulles
GERO VON SCHULZE-GAEVERNITZ, (1901–1971).
An assistant to Allen Dulles of the U.S. Office of Strategic
Services (OSS), Gero von Schulze-Gaevernitz was born on 27 September 1901, the
son of a distinguished political scientist and liberal politician. During his
early years, he traveled to Russia and worked in the United States, lured by
the stock market boom of the 1920s. Through his American mother, a daughter of
the wealthy financier Otto Kahn, U.S. citizenship proved easy to obtain. At the
outbreak of World War II, possessing little experience in diplomacy, Gaevernitz
offered his services to American authorities in Bern, Switzerland, in the
struggle against Adolf Hitler. His initial assignment was as a liaison to
German exiles in the U.S. legation, where he was a friend of military attaché
Barnwell Legge. He also made numerous trips between Germany and Switzerland
prior to Hitler’s declaration of war on the United States.
The arrival of Dulles in Bern marked the beginning of an
unusually fruitful wartime collaboration. At their first meeting in November
1942, Gaevernitz impressed Dulles (who had earlier known his father) by his
serious commitment to the German resistance to Hitler. Known as 476 according
to the OSS rolls, he became a fulltime executive officer, unlike most of the
other numbered sources. An attempt to provide him with cover as an attaché for
the Office of Economic Warfare met with the stern disapproval of the State
Department, and Gaevernitz therefore remained outwardly a private citizen
engaging in diverse business activities. His chief function was to screen
individuals desiring an audience with Dulles, as neutral Switzerland teemed
with exiles, spies, Nazis, anti-Nazis, and sheer curiosity-seekers.
Particularly noteworthy was Gaevernitz’s role in bringing Hans Bernd Gisevius
of the Abwehr to his chief’s attention. Gaevernitz also coordinated the efforts
of an informal group of exiled politicians calling themselves “Das
demokratische Deutschland” (Democratic Germany), who were concerned about the
postwar configuration of the country.
The official Allied policy of “unconditional surrender”
adopted at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 severely complicated the
work of Gaevernitz and Dulles. While bound to respect its provisions, they
nevertheless gave a measure of “quiet encouragement” to the German resistance,
especially those involved in the plot of 20 July 1944 to assassinate Hitler.
Gaevernitz figured prominently as well in Operation sunrise, the secret
negotiations that resulted in an early surrender of German forces in northern
Italy. Yet his plan to have captured German officers accompany advancing Allied
armies as an advisory force was rejected by the staff of U.S. General Dwight D.
Eisenhower.
With the military defeat of Germany, Gaevernitz, along with
Dulles, advocated a lenient and less categorical occupation policy. Remaining
in Switzerland, he attempted to rehabilitate the German contacts he had brought
to the OSS and compiled a card file of Germans who should and should not be
consulted by occupation authorities. His last major cooperative effort with
Dulles was a written account of Operation sunrise, The Secret Surrender (1966).
Two years later, Gaevernitz revised a motion picture script based on the book.
He died on 6 April 1971 in the Canary Islands.
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