Allied invasion of southern Italy. The Allied plan for the
invasion of the Italian mainland called for a three-pronged effort. In
Operation BAYTOWN, General Bernard L. Montgomery’s Eighth Army would cross the
Strait of Messina and land at Calabria on 3 September; then it would work its way
north. The following day, in Operation SLAPSTICK, 3,600 soldiers of the British
1st Paratroop Division would drop on the Italian port of Taranto. The third
part of the invasion, Operation AVALANCHE, was the largest. It involved the
landing of two corps, the British X and the U.S. VI, at Salerno on 9 September.
The goal was to then secure the port of Naples 30 miles to the northwest.
U.S. Navy Vice Admiral H. Kent Hewitt had overall command of
the operation. U.S. Rear Admiral John L. Hall had charge of the mainly American
Southern Attack Force, and Royal Navy Commodore G. N. Oliver commanded the
largely British Northern Attack Force. British Navy Rear Admiral Philip Vian
commanded one fleet carrier and four escort carriers assisting with air cover.
In all, 627 vessels participated in the operation.
Lieutenant General Mark Clark commanded the Fifth Army, the
ground force for AVALANCHE. The Fifth Army consisted of the British X Corps of
the 46th and 56th Divisions and the U.S. VI Corps of the 36th and 45th Divisions.
Two battalions of U.S. Rangers and two of British commandos were included to
secure key passes northwest of Salerno.
The Allies expected no opposition. On 8 September 1943,
hours before the assault forces landed, General Dwight D. Eisenhower broadcast
that Italy had signed an armistice with the Allies. Clark fully expected to be
able to secure Naples quickly and then throw a line across Italy, trapping
German units between his own army and the British Eighth Army to the south.
Clark decided to forego a preliminary bombardment, which meant German forces
that had occupied the Italian positions were virtually undisturbed. As it
evolved for the Allies, the battle was confusing and hard to control,
developing its own momentum.
At 3:10 A.M. on 9 September, the Rangers began going ashore
to secure the Allied northern flank. They were followed 20 minutes later by men
of the U.S. 36th Infantry Division, who secured the southern flank. The British
X Corps then landed between the Rangers and the 36th Infantry Division. The
56th Infantry Division secured the southern sector of the British corps area,
and the 46th Infantry Division secured the north sector. With the support of
the Rangers and X Corps, British commandos were able to land at the town of
Salerno itself.
On the first day, the Germans mounted only sporadic,
small-scale counterattacks. German Theater commander Field Marshal Albert
Kesselring immediately ordered his forces south of Salerno to withdraw from
southern Italy to prevent them being cut off. The German 16th Panzer Division
was to oppose the Salerno landings and prevent any Allied deep penetration
there until German troops from the south became available. The Germans
concentrated the limited forces initially available against the British X
Corps.
On the morning of 10 September, General Clark visited both
corps zones. Because VI Corps was making better progress, Clark assigned it 4
miles of the X Corps’ area. This, however, stretched the Americans thin.
Meanwhile, more men and equipment came ashore, although a shortage of landing
craft hampered operations. Naval gunfire, however, strongly supported the
troops ashore. During the Salerno operation, Allied warships fired more than
11,000 tons of shell to assist shore operations. On 11 September, German
aircraft launched glide bombs at the Allied ships, damaging 2 cruisers, and
other attacks followed. On 16 September, 2 glide bombs badly damaged the
British battleship Warspite.
On 13 September, the Germans launched their first major
counterattack, overrunning a battalion of the 36th Infantry Division, but they
then encountered stiff resistance along the banks of the Calore River. Tank,
tank-destroyer, and artillery units poured fire into the ranks of the attacking
Germans, and accurate naval gunfire played an important role. With the
beachhead seemingly in jeopardy, on the night of 13 September two battalions
(1,300 men) of the 82nd Airborne Division were air-dropped into the 36th
Infantry Division sector and quickly thrown into the line.
Throughout 14 September, German units attacked all along the
line, probing for weak spots. Meanwhile, Allied aircraft pounded German lines
of communication and frontline positions. Elements of the British 7th Armored
Division now landed to reinforce X Corps, and the 180th Infantry Regiment
landed in VI Corps’ sector. That night, another 2,100 paratroopers of the 82nd
Airborne Division arrived, further reinforcing the line.
Another airborne operation occurred on the night of 14
September to insert the 2nd Battalion of the 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment
20 miles north of the X Corps zone. Its assignment was to harass German lines
of communications for 5 days, then either infiltrate back into the beachhead or
link up with advancing units. Only 15 of the 40 transport aircraft involved
dropped their men near the target area; most of the paratroopers landed far
from their intended drop zones. Although the men of the battalion caused some
disruption in the German rear areas, they paid a heavy price; of the 600 men who
participated in the jump, only 400 gained friendly lines.
On 15 September, Kesselring ordered another counterattack,
which failed in the teeth of the Allied reinforcement. Clark now had more than
150,000 men ashore. Meanwhile, Montgomery’s Eighth Army was still 50 miles to
the south, making slow progress against only light German resistance.
Kesselring knew he could no longer hope to defeat the Allies at Salerno, and on
16 September the Germans began a deliberate, well-executed withdrawal
northward. The Eighth and Fifth Armies finally linked up on 19 September. The
Allies first entered Naples on 1 October.
The Salerno battle had been costly for both sides. The
British had suffered 5,259 casualties and the Americans 1,649. German killed,
wounded, and missing were 3,472. The next target was to secure Naples. Salerno
was a clear indication that much hard fighting lay ahead.
References
Blumenson, Martin. United States Army in World War II; The Mediterranean
Theater of Operations, Salerno to Cassino. Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, 1969. Hickey, Des. Operation Avalanche: The Salerno Landings. London:
Heinemann, 1983. Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval
Operations in World War II. Vol. 9, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio: January 1943–June
1944. Boston: Little, Brown, 1954. Morris, Eric. Salerno: A Military Fiasco.
New York: Stein and Day, 1983.
Great Work! Used this for my Facebook History Group! Please Join! The members requested more coverage on the Italian Campaign! https://www.facebook.com/groups/WesternFrontWW2/
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