As V-E Day came, Allied forces in Western Europe consisted
of 4.5 million men, including 9 armies (5 of them American—1 of which, the
Fifteenth, saw action only at the last), 23 corps, 91 divisions (61 of them
American), 6 tactical air commands (4 American), and 2 strategic air forces (1
American). The Allies had 28,000 combat aircraft, of which 14,845 were
American; and they had brought into Western Europe more than 970,000 vehicles
and 18 million tons of supplies. At the same time they were achieving final
victory in Italy with 18 divisions (7 of them American).
The German armed forces and the nation were prostrate,
beaten to a degree never before seen in modern times. Hardly any organized
units of the German Army remained except in Norway, Denmark, Czechoslovakia,
and the Balkans; these would soon capitulate. What remained of the air arm was
too demoralized even for a final suicidal effort, and the residue of the German
Navy lay helpless in captured northern ports. Through five years of war, the
German armed forces had lost over 3 million men killed, 263,000 of them in the
west, since D-Day. The United States lost 135,576 dead in Western Europe; while
Britain, Canada, France, and other Allies combined incurred after D-Day
approximately 60,000 military deaths.
Unlike in World War I, when the United States had come late
on the scene and provided only those forces to swing the balance of power to
the Allied side, the American contribution to the reconquest of Western Europe
had been predominant, not just in manpower but as a true arsenal of democracy.
American factories produced for the British almost three times more Lend-Lease
materials than for the Russians, including 185,000 vehicles, 12,000 tanks, and
enough planes to equip four tactical air forces and for the French all weapons
and equipment for 8 divisions and 1 tactical air force plus partial equipment
for 3 more divisions.
Although strategic air power had failed to prove the
decisive instrument many had expected, it was a major factor in the Allied
victory, as was the role of Allied navies; for without control of the sea
lanes, there could have been no buildup in Britain and no amphibious assaults.
It was nonetheless true that the application of the power of ground armies
finally broke the German ability and will to resist.
While the Germans had developed a flying bomb and later a supersonic
missile, the weapons with which both sides fought the war were in the main much
improved versions of those that had been present in World War I: the motor
vehicle, the airplane, the machine gun, indirect-fire artillery, the tank. The
difference lay in such accoutrements as improved radio communications and in a
new sophistication in terms of mobility and coordination that provided the
means for rapid exploitation that both sides in World War I had lacked.
From North Africa to the Elbe, U.S. Army generalship proved
remarkably effective. Such field commanders as Bradley, Devers, Clark, Hodges,
Patton, Simpson, Patch, and numerous corps and division commanders could stand
beside the best that had ever served the nation. Having helped develop Army doctrine
during the years between the two great wars, these same men put the theories to
battlefield test with enormous success. Some indication of the magnitude of the
responsibilities they carried is apparent from the fact that late in the war
General Bradley as commander of the 12th Army Group had under his command 4
field armies, 12 corps, and 48 divisions, more than 1.3 million men, the
largest exclusively American field command in U.S. history.
These commanders consistently displayed a steady devotion to
the principles of war. Despite sometimes seemingly insurmountable obstacles of
weather, terrain, and enemy concentration, they were generally able to achieve
the mass, mobility, and firepower to avoid a stalemate, maintaining the
principles of the objective and the offensive and exploiting the principle of
maneuver to the fullest. On many occasions they achieved surprise, most notably
in the amphibious assaults and at the Rhine. They were themselves taken by
surprise twice, in central Tunisia and in the Ardennes; yet in both cases they
recovered quickly. Economy of force was particularly evident in Italy, and
simplicity was nowhere better demonstrated than in the Normandy landings,
despite a complexity inherent in the size and diversity of the invasion forces.
From the first, unity of command abided in every campaign, not just at the
tactical level but also in the combined staff system that afforded the U.S. and
Britain a unity of command and purpose never approached on the Axis side.
No comments:
Post a Comment